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FEMINISM, MASCULINITIES, AND
MULTIPLE IDENTITIES
Martha Albertson Fineman*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that feminist legal theorists might productively use
the scholarship on masculinities that has been developed over the past decade.
There are several ways in which masculinities scholarship might interact with
feminist legal theory. Masculinities scholarship could be seen as distinct from
and complementary to feminist theory—an independent and parallel compan-
ion theory, developed by men. In this regard, from a feminist’s perspective
masculinities scholarship might be thought of as ethnography, helpfully provid-
ing insights into the operations and assumptions of a distinct masculine culture.
This approach would seem to validate the notion that there are significant dif-
ferences between men’s and women’s experiences and perspectives, and con-
sideration of both is necessary to form a complete legal theory picture. Feminist
legal theory and masculinities theory are thus seen as both contrasting and com-
plementary in nature.
On the other hand, masculinities scholarship can be understood as provid-
ing the basis for a critique of feminist legal theory. This approach begins with
the allegation that feminist legal theory generally and incorrectly treats men as
a monolithic group when there is in fact a multiplicity of male identities. Mas-
culinities scholarship, in this framing, could be categorized as the male-focused
companion to critiques that have been made over the past thirty years that femi-
nist legal theory is excluding and essentializing. It is this understanding of the
significance of masculinities to feminist legal theory that prompted this Essay.
I begin with summarizing some of the recent work on masculinities and
reflect on the relevance of masculinities scholarship to feminist legal theorists.
Specifically, I am concerned with the role of identity-based approaches in criti-
cal legal theory (feminist or otherwise critical), particularly how they often
result in unnecessarily vigorous, overly broad, and ill-conceived accusations
about exclusion and silencing that have otherwise similarly oriented individuals
at odds with each other. That form of academic criticism may build individual
careers, but it also negatively channels energy and resources away from a com-
prehensive critical legal project in which the demand for social justice is a
universal one.
This objective of universality is important. When we deal with the law and
the relationship between legal institutions and the structuring of power and
authority, as well as their allocation among the individual, the state, and socie-
tal institutions, we employ a system dependent on the process of classification,
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generalization, and universal applicability. My reservations about masculinities
theories, and other identity-focused approaches to law, reflect my belief that the
most important task for those interested in a social justice project at this partic-
ular time in legal history in the United States is to construct a legal subject with
which to replace the abstract liberal subject with its accompanying and unreal-
istic constructs of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and independence. This new
legal subject must be based on an appreciation of the human condition in order
to effectively displace the rhetoric of personal responsibility, small govern-
ment, and condemnation of state intervention. The liberal subject is a universal
construct and, so, must be its alternative. This is not an argument that discrimi-
nation on the basis of categories such as race, gender, or sexual orientation is
no longer a problem in the United States. Nor do I suggest that stronger reme-
dies for discrimination are needed. My question is, as interesting as the decon-
struction of traditional legal categories such as “woman” and “man” might be,
how does the fragmented multiplicity of modified legal subjects that remain
after such deconstruction aid a legal theorist in constructing an approach within
the confines of our imperfect system to address problems, such as poverty and
lack of social mobility, that transcend those fragmented identities?
II. MASCULINITIES CLAIMS
Basically, the argument of identity-focused scholars critical of feminist
legal theory has been that the theory reflects a “white women’s heteronorma-
tive” perspective that both obscures the complexity and nuances of different
experiences and excludes the voices, if not the actual women, who are not
white, middle-class, and heterosexual.1 Such exclusion necessitates the devel-
opment of a separate feminist (or womanist) legal theory that adopts as a cen-
tral element the experiences, narratives, and stories of an excluded group.2
Concepts such as intersectionality allow the inclusion and bundling of identity
characteristics, locating the subject of such legal theory at the intersection of a
multiplicity of categories.3 The general category of “women” is, thus, frag-
1 See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT ix (1988); see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001); Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
2 The general nature of the charges often extend beyond the totalizing tendency of theory
constructed by and for “white middle-class heterosexual women” to offer theoretical reme-
dies for other cultural and social transgressors. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Reading Back,
Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 9–11 (2006) (advocating “reading black” to critically
read opinions and narratives attentive to the race); John Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness:
Towards a Middle-Eastern Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (contending people of
middle-eastern descent need scholarship focused on them because of their unique position—
having the same status as white people on paper but without recourse for legal action in the
post-9/11 environment); Sunny Woan, White Sexual Imperialism: A Theory of Asian Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275, 277 (2008) (arguing
that women of Asian descent face “white sexual imperialism,” which has created a hyper-
sexualized stereotype of Asian women).
3 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Fem-
inist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989); Harris, supra note 1, at 615; Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
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mented by the modification of that general grouping by the inclusion of per-
sonal identity characteristics, often in a binary manner.4 So we now have white
women and Black women, heterosexual women and lesbians or, perhaps more
complexly, the Black woman who is also a lesbian. The idea that these sorts of
differences among women mean that there cannot be a shared core woman’s
experience is foundational to the critical stance of perspective critiques. So too
is the idea that the voices and perspectives of those who are different from
some perceived dominant group (white, heterosexual, and middle class women)
have been excluded. This different-and-excluded perspective critique has been
labeled “outsider” scholarship to reflect both of these premises.5 It is not
always clear whether it is the law or the dominant feminist theorist who is
being criticized for such exclusion, but the remedy is seen as the development
of a distinct intersectional legal category.
Masculinities theory extends this critique of feminist legal theory’s exclu-
sionary bias by fragmenting the category of “men.” Masculinities scholarship
concedes that there are differences between men and women that might be the-
oretically relevant, as well as recognizing that men have been present (not been
excluded from) feminist legal theory.6 The exclusion and silencing at issue here
is the result of men, rather than women, being essentialized. The allegation is
that men in feminist theory have been cast primarily as oppressors or
subordinators of women.7
In particular, the charge is that feminist legal theorists have not
approached men as the objects of gender analysis.8 It is argued that if we were
to do so, we would see significant differences exist among men, just as we do
among women.9 Further, recognizing differences among men would disrupt the
narrative of gender subordination or domination, since feminist legal scholars
would be compelled to concede that individual women may be in privileged
positions compared to marginalized men.10 One goal in making multiple mas-
culinities visible is that feminist legal theorizing would acknowledge and per-
haps even address the barriers men encounter in interactions with each other
and with women, as well as the prices men pay for the male or patriarchal
privilege, which has so occupied feminist thought.11
Some masculinities scholars argue that feminists must now take up the
study of masculine identities, incorporating the insights thus revealed in order
to correct an exclusionary feminist project as it is going forward.12 Feminist
Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Ade-
quate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307–09 (2001).
4 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991).
5 See Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
683, 685–87 (1992) (outlining outsider scholarship and providing examples).
6 NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 13 (2010).
7 See id.
8 See id. at 23.
9 See id. at 27.
10 See id. at 4–5.
11 See, e.g., id. at 61.
12 See, e.g., Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a New Frame-
work for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 431–33
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legal scholars are admonished to explore men’s experiences with women from
the men’s perspectives, rather than only considering women’s experiences with
men from women’s perspectives.13 Additionally, we are told that men’s rela-
tionships and interactions with other men affect the ways in which they express
their masculinity, an interactive process that has significant implications for
how they will contemporaneously interact with women.14
In a masculinities approach there seem to be two distinct ways in which
men are differentiated from each other and then strewn along a hierarchical
continuum of masculinities. First, it is asserted that a “hegemonic”15 masculin-
ity is in operation, constructed in such a way that it is a status that few if any
men are actually able to achieve.16 The idea is that every man is always in
struggle to become or attain hegemonic masculinity, but the status is never
arrived at in any stable form.17 Hegemonic masculinity is a state or status that
must constantly be defended.18 Further, since heterosexuality is central in
achieving hegemonic masculinity, individual men must be vigilant to act in
ways that reinforce the fact that they are neither gay nor a woman (or woman-
like).19 In this rendering, all men are subordinated, although it is to an ideal,
rather than to some other defined group in society. Subordination in this form
would seem to be in constant flux over an individual man’s lifetime, as he
(2010); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1105–06 (1996).
13 Levit, supra note 12, at 1105–06 (“For feminism to succeed in promoting large-scale
societal change, not only must it be nonexclusionary, but at least a critical mass of men must
become feminists.”); see also RICHARD COLLIER, Men, Masculinities and Law: The “Man
Question” in Legal Studies, in MEN, LAW AND GENDER 7, 9, 19 (2010); R. Lea Brilmayer,
Inclusive Feminism, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 377, 383, 385–86 (1993).
14 As part of that inquiry, we are to ask how race and class, in particular, intersect with and
complicate the experience of masculinity for individual men. See DOWD, supra note 6, at 28.
15
“[P]reponderant influence or authority over others . . . . the social, cultural, ideological, or
economic influence exerted by a dominant group.” Hegemony Definition, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hegemony (last visited Feb. 24,
2013). This definition implies that hegemonic masculinity is constructed and employed by
actual people acting with awareness, intent—that it is a conscious and considered strategy of
control that is only available to the most powerful, rather than the product of diffuse and
undisciplined cultural and social forces. If it is a status seldom if ever achieved by individual
men, however, one wonders just who constitutes the person or group that controls or domi-
nates and just how that domination is accomplished if things are so fluid.
16 See R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the
Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829, 846 (2005) (explaining that the hierarchy of masculini-
ties is a fundamental feature of masculinities); see also R.W. Connell, Psychoanalysis on
Masculinity, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 11, 14 (Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman eds.,
1994); R.W. Connell, The History of Masculinity, in THE MASCULINITY STUDIES READER
245, 252 (Rachel Adams & David Savran eds., 2002).
17 See SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 29–30 (1999);
MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY 25,
33 (2005); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 741 (2009).
18 DOWD, supra note 6, at 28.
19 Id.
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could slide up or down the hierarchical scale that measures his masculinity
against the hegemonic ideal.20
In addition to this generalized subordination, some subsets of men are seen
to be in a position of relatively fixed or stable subordination due to the fact that
hegemonic masculinity is also raced and classed.21 The argument in this regard
is that when men have characteristics that are deemed inherently incompatible
with the hegemonic masculinity, they can be further subordinated because of
the way those characteristics intersect with their masculinity.22 This line of
argument, as well as the observations about the centrality of heterosexuality to
hegemonic masculinity reflects and parallels some of the criticisms of feminist
legal theory. The larger category of “men” is rejected as too essentializing and
also as excluding individual characteristics that are as if not more relevant to
the subordination analysis.23 Individual men should not only be seen as men,
but also seen as situated along axes of interacting hierarchies of race and class
in particular, and perhaps also differences in ability, ethnicity, age, or relig-
ion.24 Therefore, it is as important to distinguish among men and look at the
ways in which different men are both differently subordinated and differently
privileged within dominant cultural, legal, and socially-imposed understandings
of masculinity through those hierarchies.
Recognition that men are different from one another is not seen as sug-
gesting that men as a group are in equivalent positions compared with women
as a group in regard to subordination.25 Most masculinities scholars concede
that men as a group remain relatively privileged and that patriarchal privilege
continues to matter in social, political, and economic relations.26 What these
scholars seek is that men not be treated as an undifferentiated monolithic group
as women make claims about the ways in which gender operates in society in
developing feminist legal theory. Since women’s subordination is inevitably
intertwined with men’s—one cannot be understood without the other—the
result of an excursion into masculinities will be a clarification and reorientation
of feminists’ own explorations of inequality.
20 The hegemonic ideal could also evolve and change form over time. Nancy E. Dowd,
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 209 (2008)
(“Seeing masculinity as a social construct rejects, and in fact critiques, the notion of a set or
stable sex role that one acquires or masculinity as an inevitable phase of development from
child to adult, from boy to man.”).
21 See KIMMEL, supra note 17, at 30–31, 33; see also KIMMEL, Gendering Desire, in THE
GENDER OF DESIRE, supra note 17, at 3, 22; KIMMEL, Pornography and Male Sexuality, in
THE GENDER OF DESIRE, supra note 17, at 65, 78–79.
22 See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 297–98 (2002).
23 Jeff Hearn, From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men, 5 FEMINIST THEORY
49, 66 (2004). See also John Remy, Patriarchy and Fratriarchy as Forms of Androcracy, in
MEN, MASCULINITIES & SOCIAL THEORY 43, 51–53 (Jeff Hearn & David Morgan eds.,
1990).
24 See Ehrenreich, supra note 22, at 275; see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar
Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 856 n.8 (2006).
25 See Hearn, supra note 23, at 57.
26 See RAEWYN CONNELL, GENDER 142 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the “patriarchal dividend”
as the benefit men derive from their dominance over the other gender).
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Some prominent feminist legal scholars have taken up the challenges
offered by masculinities critiques. For example, Nancy Dowd uses insights
from masculinities theory in examining the situation of boys in the contexts of
education and the juvenile justice system and men in regard to fatherhood and
sexual abuse.27 Using this approach Dowd concludes: education is an expressly
and formally “gender-neutral” system, but the structure, culture, and norms that
are in operation within the system are gendered and often work against the
interests of both boys and girls, although differently.28 The juvenile justice sys-
tem, by contrast, has been designed with boys in mind—or a version of boy-
hood that is criminalized—and thus fails to meet the needs of girls who enter
the system and, ironically, also fails the boys around whom it was designed.
Fatherhood is an inherently male-identified role, but the specifically gendered
nature of fatherhood has not been explored.29 Sexual abuse typically calls to
mind a male stranger and a female victim, while the reality is that men are also
victims, women are also abusers, and quite often the abuser is a family member
or person with a close relationship to the victim.30
Dowd argues that a masculinities approach calls attention to, or “exposes”
male gendering and challenges us to think of boys and girls/men and women
complexly and simultaneously as in relation to each other rather than discreet
and independent subjects.31 Considering masculinities also locates those rela-
tionships within specific societal institutions. As she uses masculinities theory,
it is not an end in itself but a way to try to understand complex social relation-
ships and structures, such as those found in the family or educational system.32
Dowd concedes there is some danger women might be excluded or marginal-
ized in an analysis that also encompasses the position of men, who typically
have more societal power and privilege than women, but she admonishes us to
take not an “either/or” but rather a “both/and” perspective.33 Her ultimate focus
on institutional arrangements and relationships she hopes will lessen the danger
of excessively male-focused analyses, particularly when the expressed objec-
tive of including men’s experiences is to show the true scope and nature of the
harm under patriarchy: harm that is universal, shared by men and women, even
if it is also differently experienced. Dowd’s attempt to point out distortions and
inadequacies in the functioning of institutions using a multiplicity of identities/
complexity of subjects approach is admirable. However, her efforts also point
out the limitations of an identity approach.
Using identities inevitably brings the inquiry back to a search for specific
targeted discrimination based on those identities. Those so identified are splin-
tered off from the universal legal subject (the liberal legal subject) and, as a
now differentiated part of the whole, measured against the universal ideal to see
27 DOWD, supra note 6, at 73–125.
28 Id. at 84; see also Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice
and Diversity in Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 486 (2005).
29 See DOWD, supra note 6, at 105; but see NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 2–3
(2000) (discussing data known about fathers and fatherhood); ANDREA DOUCET, DO MEN
MOTHER? FATHERING, CARE, AND DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY 21 (2006).
30 See DOWD, supra note 6, at 125.
31 See id. at 65–66.
32 Id. at 26–27.
33 Id. at 67.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ215.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-MAY-13 8:47
Winter 2013] MASCULINITY & MULTIPLE IDENTITIES 625
if differences in treatment, status, or position are impermissible. This compara-
tive process is inevitable in a discrimination analysis, but if we want the inquiry
to go to institutional and structural inequalities that are not (or are no longer)
based on intentional impermissible discrimination, making multiple identities
central to the analysis will be difficult to do in practice and may actually further
obscure problems not captured by or transcending those identities. Dowd con-
cedes that it is difficult to both hold multiplicities in mind (and not privilege
one over others) and make the analysis relevant to the objective of suggesting
institutional transformation through law. Interesting from my perspective is the
fact that her book contains few concrete suggestions for engagement with law
and law reform. This is not a criticism of the book, which does offer, even if in
abstract terms, suggestions and admonitions directed to feminist legal scholars:
“Adding men should not mean displacing women, and it requires a willingness
to consider the position of the dominant gender group while demanding that the
dominant group acknowledge and commit to the achievement of liberation and
justice for women while raising men’s and boys’ issues.”34
And in regard to sexual abuse:
[T]he focus on child sexual abuse has unintentionally meant that other forms of abuse
have been given less attention. The negative consequences of that focus are dispro-
portionate for boys. In addition, this focus has avoided the reality that women consti-
tute the majority of offenders. The dynamic of that pattern of maltreatment and abuse
is a critical part of understanding motherhood that must be addressed.35
My concern with such insights is not that either is inappropriate, but that
they seem more directed at giving guidance for the reform of feminist legal
scholarship than focused on how legal institutions and practice might be
approached and reformed.
I am also concerned with the ways that a focus on identities can narrow or
constrict the critical imagination. In focusing on the gendered categories of
“mother” and “father,” for example, we may fail to see and critically explore
the institution of the family and its role in the larger society. Looking at the
examples Dowd uses, I would ask different questions. For example, why isn’t
the fact that we routinely incarcerate children, regardless of their gender, the
issue, and not the fact that incarcerated boys and girls are differently disadvan-
taged in a system that treats everyone inhumanly?36 Isn’t the more pressing
question in regard to education the lack of resources for public schools, the
overcrowding, and other problems that have resulted from significant ideologi-
cal shifts in the United States around privatization? The whole idea of public
education is under attack, not because it is failing boys and girls differently, but
34 Id. at 85.
35 Id. at 138.
36 See Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-
Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 494 (2011) (“The
politics of criminal law [in the United States] have generally resulted in a one-way ratchet
toward harsher policies and punishments . . . .”). But see Gerard de Jonge, Youth, Crime and
Juvenile Justice in the Netherlands, 4 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 25, 28–29 (2004)
(explaining some of the measures taken towards a more humane juvenile detention system in
the Netherlands).
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because, increasingly, politicians and powerful interests assert that the govern-
ment should not be in the business of providing it.37
In regard to parenting, isn’t the dilemma not that fatherhood has been dif-
ferently gendered, but that both genders have been shaped by the fact that
dependency is politically perceived as primarily the responsibility of the private
family, and this necessitates some role division as between wage earner and
caretaker?38 Historically this role division was gendered, but the social disad-
vantages are attached to the role or status of the caretaker, not the sex of the
person performing the care. What is needed is not more gender equality in law,
but a more responsive state and accommodating workplace policies.39 Simi-
larly, understanding the extent and nature of child abuse in all its forms would
not only look at and compare abusive fathers’ with abusive mothers’ behavior,
but also critique the condoning effects of religious and cultural premises that
parents “own” their children and have not only a right but a duty to discipline
them.40 The legal manifestation of this state abandonment of its responsibility
to children is found in the extensive parental rights doctrines that shape policy
in regard to education as well.
If the use of even the broad categories of male and female and the critical
tool of gender construction can obscure structural issues, it seems wrong to
suggest that further deconstruction of those categories will help in the reforma-
tion of complex social relations and structures. Critical legal scholarship should
be generative of solutions as well as critical?41
37 See, e.g., Julianne Hing, Bobby Jindal, Using ALEC Playbook, Radically Reshapes Pub-
lic Education, COLORLINES (Apr. 23, 2012, 8:44 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/
04/bobby_jindal_using_alec_playbook_signs_education_reform_overhaul.html; see also
Salvatore Colleluori & Brian Powell, How ALEC Is Quietly Influencing Education Reform in
Georgia, MEDIAMATTERS FOR AM. (May 9, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://mediamatters.org/
research/2012/05/09/how-alec-is-quietly-influencing-education-refor/184156.
38 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 59, 67 (2004) [hereinafter
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH].
39 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Auton-
omy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 14, 25–26 (2000).
40 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Individualism and Early Childhood in the U.S.: How
Culture and Tradition Have Impeded Evidence-Based Reform, 8 J. KOREAN L. 135, 138
(2008) (explaining how notions of “parental authority” have worked as an impediment to
fostering the rights of children in the United States). United States law gives parents a great
amount of deference in upbringing their children in United States law because of the pre-
sumption that they act in the child’s best interests. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400, 402–03 (1923) (holding that parents have a right to direct the upbringing of their
children, including control over the child’s education); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925) (reiterating that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right
“to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972)
(recognizing the privacy right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children).
41 I am not referring to the generation of yet more law review articles here, but to the
creation of progressive social legal policy that can actually make a difference in the ways in
which the system operates.
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III. LEGAL THEORY AND SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION
The masculinities critique, as well as other critiques of feminist legal the-
ory raises a question with which I have grappled my entire academic career:
Should feminist legal theorists give up on the possibility that law can be used to
advance a positive social justice and equality project because the legal catego-
ries we are compelled to use are inevitably imperfect? This question suggests
an even broader issue as to how the law in general and critical legal theory in
particular should respond to socially produced economic, political, and struc-
tural differences among and between individuals and groups in society. The
problems inherent in using the general categories of women and men to explore
one aspect of difference—that of gender—and its implications for institutional
relationships are multiplied in the contexts of intersectional or multidimen-
sional identities. Perhaps the feminist legal theorists should confine themselves
to criticism as outsiders—to the deconstruction of legal categories and the fer-
reting out of situations not addressed or interests seemingly ignored—and
abandon the idea of constructive legal reform.
Of course, a great deal would have been lost if feminist legal theorists had
abandoned reform aspirations in the past. Feminist legal theory brought into
existence innovations in legal thought and generated substantive changes in the
way gender is addressed in law. Using the now vilified category of “women,”
feminists in law used gender equality as the concept with which to suggest
reforms of significant sites of inequality, such as the workplace, family, and
public sphere. Reforms in those areas benefited many women across their dif-
ferences (and some men in spite of their gender difference).42
In fact, when legal feminists entered the field, the categories of women
and men were defined as different and contrasted with one another in laws that
structured many of society’s institutions. One could even say that historically
the law actually recognized two distinct legal subjects: one male and one
female. The object of legal feminism was to challenge those different institu-
tional and identity constructions, which tended to disadvantage and justify
exclusion of women as a legally defined group.43 Feminist legal theorists
imagined utopian gender-neutral and egalitarian visions for society (some
might label them dystopian) and brought concepts reflecting gendered institu-
tional arrangements such as “care-work” (which was to be valued equally with
paid work) and “marital property” (which recognized different, but equally
important, forms of contribution to the accumulation of wealth and property)
into mainstream legal and political discourse and made them the basis for
42 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Unique-
ness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1540–41 (1974); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1118, 1118–20 (1986); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1–2 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196–200
(1982).
43 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 13, 14–16 (2005).
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reform.44 They also created legal harms from what had been invisible gendered
experiences for many women, “discovering” things like domestic violence and
marital rape, and toppled the common law concept of husbands as disciplina-
rian heads of households.45 The idea of using law to get at such inequalities is
hard to abandon, at least for feminist scholars of that generation.
There should be significant questions about how far fragmenting the legal
subject along multiple axes of identity characteristics can get us in using law to
develop a reconstructive social justice project.46 In fact, it could be argued that
the turn to multiplicities of identities has actually worked to derail a social
justice project that began in the 1960s using broad categories of race and gen-
der, in that fragmenting identities may have contributed to shattering old alli-
ances and impeded the formation of broad and effective new coalitions.
Differences can be used to divide groups who might otherwise come together in
the interest of working toward greater social justice.
Equally harmful to a broadly conceived and inclusive social justice project
is the way in which identity categories have become proxies through which we
articulate and understand social inequalities such as poverty and other forms of
social disadvantages.47 Attribution of socially produced disadvantage to the
mistreatment of only some groups detracts from the development of a systemic
analysis of the political and economic organization of the United States at the
beginning of the twenty-first century and the ways in which subordination and
inequalities are generated and shared across identities.48 Equally problematic
for the likely success of the approach is the way in which identities-focused
analysis tends to concentrate attention on identifying “victims” and also, gener-
ally, is premised on the assumption that there are, or have been in the recent
past, individual or institutional villains.49 This assumption is often difficult to
prove and many people, including judges and jurors, go to great lengths to find
reasons other than discrimination for behavior by focusing on plaintiffs’ con-
duct or attitude rather than defendants’.50
44 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 95
(1989) (suggesting that a woman’s problems are not just hers alone but of women as a
whole, and we must address the problems as a whole, through political solutions).
45 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
170 (1987).
46 The approaches to the legal subject by categorizations of feminism might not be particu-
larly useful. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 15–22
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing the three stages of feminist legal theory: the equality stage, the
difference stage, and the diversity stage.)
47 See Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749,
765 (2009) (discussing how awareness of inequalities arise once an awareness of difference
is established).
48 CHAMALLAS, supra note 46, at 22.
49 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1297 (2012).
50 See id. at 1296–1302 (summarizing psychological literature on the fundamental back-
ground belief of meritocracy that makes a charge of discrimination extremely difficult for
Americans to believe, even when the evidence is very strong and not contested).
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IV. LAW AS DISCIPLINE
Like feminist theory generally, masculinities theory was not initially
developed by legal theorists but evolved first in other disciplines, particularly
those of sociology and psychology.51 The initial disciplinary origins of mascu-
linities theory are important because there are significant differences between a
legal approach and that of psychology or sociology. The subject and object of
analysis are different as are the focus and methodology, which leads the disci-
plines to ask different questions and be concerned with different norms and
goals. Certainly the construction of a cultural, social, or social-science subject
involves different disciplinary considerations. The categories can be, and often
are, mandated to be more nuanced, focused on distinguishing characteristics
and used to create descriptive and explanatory categories than those in legal
scholarship and theory. This does not mean that those disciplines are irrelevant
to law or that theorists from other areas cannot use law within their disciplines.
Rather, it is merely a reminder that the legal subject is an artifact that is con-
structed by and through law in part to hide the various and varying realities of
persons of flesh and blood and confine them within the roles that they are
assigned in and through law.52 The actual legal subject at issue need not even
be a real person; it can be a corporation or association.53
Also significant is the fact that the relationship between social science
disciplines and institutions of state power are different than that of law. Of
course, theorists from those areas can play a role in court proceedings as expert
witnesses and their scholarship is used by legal theorists and in legal contexts.
But, legal scholarship directly and differently engages with state institutions
that can and do exercise considerable power and influence over people’s lives.
Lawyers as judges, legislators, or even professors generate, explicate, manipu-
late, and critique norms, rules, and systems that punish and reward certain
behaviors. The disciplining nature and force of law on an individual or institu-
tion is different—more immediate, focused, and more likely to have a direct
impact on structuring people’s lives than sociological or historical research.
The legal subject formed by law has concrete and coercive implications for real
persons and institutions.54 Further, there are unique characteristics associated
with law and its uses that affect the legal system’s ability to incorporate genera-
lized insights about differences, be they sex or race-based or found in hierar-
chies of masculinities.
The tools available to legal scholars are limited in some important ways by
the nature of legal institutions, the nature of law itself, and the constraining
norms and values of legal scholarship. For one thing, law relies on broad cate-
gories that are rather entrenched within the law as it has developed over centu-
ries as a coercive tool of the state. Law making relies on classification—the
51 See DOWD, supra note 6, at 28–29, 35 (outlining major sociological and psychological
scholars in masculinities).
52 See FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 38, at 17–20.
53 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (suggesting
that corporations are legal subjects: “the Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”).
54 See FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 38, at 17–20.
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generation of broad generalizations about individuals, groups, or classes of
things and people. This classification process occurs initially at the legislative
level, which generates systems of rules and norms that are intended to have
universal application within categories. Generalizations and aggregation are
inevitable in this process.55 Once the categories are drawn, the foundational
principle of equality before the law demands the same treatment be applied to
those who fit within the same classification. In other words, the legal or politi-
cal subject is a universal subject. Individuals may be sexed, raced, and classed;
but the whole point of equal protection of the law is to erase difference in
treatment.
On the other hand, adjudication is the means whereby individual circum-
stances are fitted into existing classification, the process whereby individual
and specific facts are assigned legal meaning or consequences on a case-by-
case basis.56 Adjudication is not an ad hoc process and the same mandate of
equal treatment applies.57 Courts make decisions using analogies and distinc-
tions within the context of rules such as those governing “precedent” and “stare
decisis,” ideally tying like things together in a web of consistent, coherent, and
predictable doctrine using classifications.58
Legal classifications are of necessity broad and take legal subjects outside
of personal history, universalizing that which might appear as inherently differ-
ent to scholars in some other disciplines. In order to “speak” to law, legal the-
ory, even of the feminist variety, must to some extent assimilate concrete and
material differences into the dominant meta-narratives of law and, as a result,
will have only a limited ability to theorize around particulars. Law is too gen-
55 Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (1992).
56 Classification and principles governing the organization of objects into groups according
to their similarities and differences or their relation to a set of criteria is evident in every
body of knowledge.
According to strict logic, organizing a domain of objects into classes must leave no two
classes with any object in common; also, all of the classes together must contain all of the objects
of the domain. This theory, however, disregards the frequency in practice of borderline cases—
i.e., objects that can with equal correctness be accepted or rejected as members of two otherwise
exclusive classes [intersection]. This is often seen in biology, where the theory of evolution
implies that some animal populations will have characteristics of two distinct species.
In practice, the principles used to classify a domain of objects depend upon the nature of the
objects themselves.
Classification Theory, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/120378/classification-theory (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). In law, the articula-
tion of perceived similarities and differences is particularly important because of the antidis-
crimination mandate in equal protection jurisprudence. The classification of process in this
situation requires a standard object against which all others are compared, the male norm
identified in feminist legal theory.
57 See J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 386 (1974) (noting that the ad hoc procedural approach
taken in administrative rulemaking is different from the procedures required in the formal
adjudication process).
58 See Stare Decisis Definition, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_
decisis (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (“Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue has been
previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Generally, courts will adhere to
the previous ruling, though this is not universally true.”).
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eral and reflective of the status quo, too rule and precedent bound to easily and
quickly absorb and reflect nonconforming experiences. Rather, operating in
society as a dominant structural paradigm and discourse, law both co-opts the
experiences of diverse groups, while also homogenizing and standardizing
those experiences as they are specifically subjected to law. Co-optation is
achieved through classification and tinkering reforms, while standardization
operates upon those individuals caught in legal constructs, such as the adver-
sarial process, rules of evidence, and the structured elements of causes of action
and claims for relief, which make it impossible to tell stories outside of legal
narratives.
Many years ago, in thinking about the imperfections of existing gendered
classifications in law, I referred to motherhood as a “colonized category”—a
category occupied exclusively by women, but given legal meaning and content
in institutions that were predominantly populated by men.59 I now realize that
most, perhaps all, legal categories are colonized to some extent. This is as true
with “men” (or the masculine) as it is with “women.” Colonization is inherent
in the classification process and classification is essential to the operation of the
legal system. The fact that broad, over- and under-inclusive classifications are
inevitable does not mean that the resulting categories, imperfect as they are,60
cannot be employed to effect positive change. Nor does it mean that the inter-
pretation and content of legal categories are not worth fighting over.
Certainly, one way out from under the criticism and accusation of essen-
tialism coming from masculinities scholars in regard to the category of men,
and from others in regard to the understanding of “women,” is for feminist
legal theorists to give up on the possibility of positive uses of law, perhaps
pursue cultural and political engagement outside of formal institutions, even
outside of academic disciplines altogether. This is the direction some feminists
are taking. Janet Halley in particular has argued that feminists should turn away
not only from law but also from feminism.61 Borrowing from Foucault’s model
of diffuse power, she asserts that any attempt to productively engage law will
simply extend the reach of regulation, administration, and discipline.62 In this
analysis the law cannot be redeemed, and trying to transform or reform law
poses risks of co-option and marginalization. Provocatively, she couples this
move away from law with a call to “take a break from feminism.” This is
justified because of the way that legal feminism has produced a legal subjectiv-
ity for women associated with experiences of oppression and/or victimization,
which are assumed to hold true for all those falling within the legal category of
women.63
59 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 51 (1995).
60 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REAL-
ITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 36–52 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY].
61 See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 304–47 (2006).
62 Id. at 124–31. See also Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY
777, 781–82 (1982) (describing “subjectivation”).
63 See HALLEY, supra note 61, at 346.
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Halley’s concerns are related to points also made by masculinities theo-
rists. She is right to insist that issues about the construction of victimhood and
conferral or denial of agency, as well as the problems associated with govern-
ance feminism’s tendency to regulate sexuality, should be explored. The law
can and does generate norms, rules, and rationalizations outside of and above
lived daily experience as a result of the co-opting/standardizing nature of legal
institutions. But there is a paradox for the critical legal theorist, or at least those
who are adherents to a law and society tradition when encountering the call to
turn away from law: law is everywhere.
Law is not only found in statutes, cases, courts and legislatures but spills
over into and permeates the daily life of individuals, entities, institutions, and
relationships. In other words, critical legal scholarship must reconcile a para-
dox: inevitably legal classifications homogenize distinct individual experiences
into some overarching whole, but law in society, and through the institutions it
creates, profoundly shapes both individual and institutional experiences. We
cannot stand outside of law any more than we can stand outside of culture. This
realization for a feminist legal scholar means that we must engage with law,
although it does not tell us what form that engagement should take.
Because we appreciate the co-opting potential and exclusionary tendencies
of law, we might not want to undertake test case litigation or draft ordinances
or lobby for specific reforms. But I do think that critical legal scholars must use
their unique understanding of law and legal institutions to bring forward a
sophisticated critique of the role of law in the construction and organization of
society and its institutions, particularly when those institutions perpetuate ine-
quality. Further, we have a responsibility to suggest concrete reforms or
changes when we can be reasonably confident that they will improve condi-
tions for some, even if not for everyone, and this is particularly true when some
in society are disadvantaged or harmed by or through law.
Feminist legal scholars recognize that legal categories or classifications
have real world consequences in people’s lives, which is why there are political
struggles over their meanings and applications. The struggles over meaning
reflect both a legal and a political process—one that takes place within a prag-
matic system that recognizes lines must be drawn and decisions made regard-
less of the incomplete or emerging nature of the underlying facts and theories.
And, of course, those in power craft the categories and definitions and in ways
that benefit themselves and their interests. Power permeates law and legal insti-
tutions. The limitations of the process can and does create problems, lead to
distortions, injustices, subordination, and discrimination.
V. LAW AND SOCIETY
My model for productive engagement with law is the Law and Society
movement.64 Long before there was an anti-essentialist critique of feminist the-
ory—long before there was anything labeled “feminist legal theory,” in fact,
64 The movement grew out of the legal realist tradition. See Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling,
From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social
Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 417–19 (1998) (outlining the history of the move-
ment); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t
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scholars, such as Karl Llewellyn,65 Willard Hurst,66 and Stewart Macaulay,67
recognized that classification, while inevitably part of the legal process, was
nonetheless susceptible to both over- and under-inclusiveness. They identified
additional problems with the implementation of law, and the “gap” between
law on the books and law in action that has been explored in countless articles
and books.68 They and other law and society scholars exposed the ways “unin-
tended consequences,” which were often also unforeseen, were all too fre-
quently the lasting product of well-intentioned law reform efforts.69
The work of legal feminists following this tradition in the 1970s and 1980s
was very attentive to the position of non-middle-class and non-white women.
Their work documented the negative repercussions that feminist-inspired law
reforms, asserted to benefit women generally, actually had on the subset of
poor women’s lives.70 I, myself, did this type of analysis in regard to gender-
neutral family law reforms and welfare reform proposals addressing the
“dilemma” of single motherhood using empirical data.71 My work urged
would-be reformers to try to lessen the possibility of unintended consequences
by self-consciously grounding analyses of existing and proposed laws in
women’s experiences broadly.72 I adopted an approach developing “middle-
range theory,” as advocated by Robert K. Merton.73 Middle range feminist
What They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 391–96 (2005) (discussing the legal realist
roots and influence on the Law and Society Movement).
65 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Group Prejudice and Social Education, in CIVILIZATION AND
GROUP RELATIONSHIPS 11, 11–13 (R. M. MacIver ed., Kennikat Press 1969) (1945); Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 431–32
(1930).
66 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 47 (1977);
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 184 (1950).
67 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCES 1028–29 (2d ed. 1977); Macaulay, supra note 64, at 390–91.
68 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910)
(originating the distinction between law in books and law in action); see also EUGEN EHR-
LICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 253, 293 (Walter L. Moll,
trans., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1936); Mark Kessler, Lawyers and Social Change in
the Postmodern World, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 769, 771 (1995); David Nelken, Law in
Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157,
157–59 (1984); William Herbert Page, Professor Ehrlich’s Czernowitz Seminar of Living
Law, 4 N. KY. L. REV. 37, 59 (1977).
69 Austin Sarat et al., The Concept of Boundaries in the Practices and Products of Sociole-
gal Scholarship: An Introduction, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANS-FOR-
MATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 1, 4 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
70 See, e.g., Linda Gordon, The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State, in WOMEN,
THE STATE, AND WELFARE 9, 9–13 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990); see also SPELMAN, supra note
1, at 72–74; Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
247 (1987); Maria O’Brien Hylton, “Parental” Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price
for Time Off, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 484–86 (1991) (assessing the effects of parental leave
on wages and job availability).
71 FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 36–38.
72 Id. at 36–39.
73 Id. at 7–8. The middle-range approach was developed by sociologist Robert K. Merton. It
sought to integrate theory with empirical research. Middle-range theory begins with an
empirical observation of a group or institution, such as the family (as opposed to a broad
abstract speculation about something like the social system). The theory is abstracted from
the concrete observations to create general statements that can be verified by subsequent
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legal theory can be distinguished from the approach of feminist legal theorists
like Catherine MacKinnon, who is more inclined to engage in the construction
of grand theoretical overarching concepts and claims about the category of
“women.”74 MacKinnon’s work has been criticized as “totalizing” insofar as it
transforms “experience into objective truth,” and middle range theory sought to
escape that sort of condemnation.75
In fact, MacKinnon has become the target of choice for those who want to
employ the essentialist critique in regard to feminist legal theory.76 Law and
society feminist scholars’ work is typically not under discussion, perhaps
because with its focus on poverty, imbalance of power, and so on, it would
disrupt the mantra of “white middle-class heterosexual feminism” that is the
entry point for so much of the perspectival or identity-based scholarship. Mid-
dle range theorists try to understand and engage with the complexity of lives on
the ground and ground their theoretical insights in those lives. Feminist legal
theorists have done this without giving up on the category of woman itself.77
The recent reinvigoration of a law and society approach apparent in the “New
Legal Realism” movement provides examples of such work.78 But even using
middle-range theory, if you resort to law, you must eventually draw lines and
make generalizations that may gloss over differences. So I am left with my
dilemma—how to productively use law to accomplish progressive reforms—
and also with a nagging concern.
Using law and legal institutions (including legal theory) can be risky, may
produce unforeseen and unintended consequences, and may overlook some dif-
ferences among people in the interests of furthering reforms to benefit the
larger group. But the tendency of some schools of critical legal theory over the
past decade or so to primarily focus on identities also may have had unintended
and unwanted consequences. In particular, identity-based analyses can obscure
the ways in which subordination is shared across identities.79 Masculinities
data. Merton’s approach was offered as an alternative to “grand” theorizing, such as with
functionalism, in sociology. See ROBERT K. MERTON, On Sociological Theories of the Mid-
dle Range, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39, 39–72 (1968).
74 See MACKINNON, supra note 45, at 2. This is a different class of distinction than the
superficial, forced and often misleading division of feminist legal theory into “liberal,” “dif-
ference,” “dominance,” and “post-modern” cubbyholes.
75 CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 70–71, 163 (1989).
76 See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUC-
TION, AND THE LAW 130–34 (1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DIS-
CRIMINATION AND THE LAW 82–83 (1989); see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An
Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE
ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 29, 38 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al.
eds., 2009); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
873–77 (1990); Harris, supra note 1, at 585.
77 See FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 7–8.
78 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
831, 831 (2008); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can
A New World Order Prompt A New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63–71 (2009);
Gregory Scott Parks, Note, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
683, 708–12 (2008).
79 Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination
Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1750 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, Beyond
Identities].
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scholarship makes this point explicit when considering different groups of men,
but it does so by differentiating men into more- or less-privileged cohorts and
distinguishing all of them from women. The continued focus on identities risks
distorting and limiting analyses and reform proposals. The most salient danger
is that continuing to primarily think about inequalities within an identities con-
text risks leaving unexamined and unchallenged wider structural disadvantages
that would not be considered discrimination under our equal-protection juris-
prudence. One can begin with identities and build outward to institutional struc-
tures. But, all too often, analysis that begins with identities also ends up there.
Even approaches focused on intersectionality (or multidimensionality) will tend
to direct critical attention to discrimination by and against individuals or, at
best, individual institutions, and not to the failure, distortions, or corruption of
societal structures more systemically.
Identity-focused critiques, because they ultimately rely on identity as the
basis for the disadvantaged (or advantaged) status or treatment, are anchored in
antidiscrimination logic and individualized assessments of behavior. Recent
theories of unconscious or implicit bias,80 while more institutionally focused,
nonetheless are tied to identities and histories of intentional discrimination
based on certain identity categories. While discrimination, intentional or uncon-
scious, remains a problem, and certainly should be addressed in law, discrimi-
nation does not capture the universe of legal inequalities.
Looking at American society, we see a growing list of material and social
inequalities. We are not guaranteed basic social goods like housing, food, and
health care. The dominant economic and political systems not only tolerate, but
also justify grossly unequal distributions of power, wealth, and opportunity.81
Nevertheless, in the United States, antidiscrimination, the sameness-of-treat-
ment version of equality, has remained resilient in the face of arguments for a
concept of equality, which is result-oriented and takes into consideration past
circumstances and future obligations, considering needs and disadvantages.
Moreover, sameness-of-treatment has been used to effectively argue against
measures like affirmative action, which might generate remedies for past
inequities.82
80 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2005); Gregory
Scott Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Abstract, A Better Metric: The Role of Unconscious
Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Race (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 08-007, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102704 (“Recent research from
social psychologists indicates that unconscious race and gender biases are widespread and
influence judgment. Because existing anti-discrimination law is designed to combat overt, or
explicit, biases, it does not address unconscious biases well.”).
81 See, e.g., John W. Lee, III, Class Warfare 1988–2005 Over Top Individual Income Tax
Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to Robin-Hood-in-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
47, 147–49 (2006) (analyzing 2005 Census data documenting the growing rich/poor gap in
American society).
82 I acknowledge that discrimination does exist, and I do recognize that these personal char-
acteristics might work to complicate the experience of vulnerability for any individual. My
claim is merely that discrimination models based on identity characteristics will not produce
circumstances of greater equality and may, in fact, lead to less in many circumstances. For
an example of this argument in the context of family law reform, see FINEMAN, THE ILLU-
SION OF EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 36 (describing how sameness of treatment has failed to
provide equality for women in the context of divorce).
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The general tendency under a sameness-of-treatment framework is to
focus on individuals and their actions. The task is to identify the perpetrators
and the victims of discrimination, and to define what the prohibited activities
were, the individual injury, and the specific intent that was involved in each
occurrence.83 Left out of the picture are systemic aspects of existing societal
arrangement, unless they can be tied to individuals and discrimination either in
the present or not too distant past. It is as if existing material, cultural, and
societal imbalance are products of natural forces which are unable to be recti-
fied by law. While it may not be able to be altered by law, such inequalities are
certainly not natural. They are produced and reproduced by society and institu-
tions. Since neither inequalities nor the systems that produce them are inevita-
ble, they too can be objects of reform.84
VI. DEFINING THE UNIVERSAL LEGAL SUBJECT
If the legal subject must be abstract, based on general principles or theo-
ries rather than on specific instances, as I have argued it has been historically,
then it seems to me that the task for a critical legal scholar is to argue for a
conception of the legal subject that is flexible, powerful, and able to incorporate
a panoply of circumstances and positions. This is an argument that we must
move beyond the impoverished legal subject of Locke and liberal thought, with
its characteristics of autonomy and independence. Perspective scholars try to do
this through intersectionality and multiplicities of identities, but I suggest we
move in exactly the opposite direction: away from the fragmentation of the
legal subject to the creation of a vigorous universal conception that will bring
under consideration not the differences among individuals, but the relationship
and complementary shared responsibilities of the individual, the state, and soci-
etal institutions in regard to responding to the realities of the human condition.
A. The Vulnerable Subject
In my recent work, I have used the idea of a universal “vulnerable subject”
to replace the one-dimensionally deformed liberal subject that is used to render
natural and inevitable relationships of dependency, need, and vulnerability
pathological and deviant.85 The concept arose from asking two fundamental
questions: (1) What should be the political and legal implications of the fact
that we are embodied beings—which means “we are born, live, and die within
a fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to destructive
external forces and internal disintegration?” (2) If “bodily needs and the messy
dependency they carry cannot be ignored in life,” how can they “be absent in
our theories about society, economics, politics, and law”? Unlike the liberal
legal subject, the vulnerable legal subject is built around the idea of “life-
83 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 4 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject].
84 See id. at 4–5.
85 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,
60 EMORY L.J. 251, 265–66 (2010).
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course,” reflecting the range of developmental and social stages through which
individuals are likely to pass in the course of a normal life span.86
The liberal legal subject at best captures only one stage—the likely least
vulnerable of the human condition.87 By contrast, the vulnerable legal subject
recognizes that, during their lives, individuals will encounter a myriad of possi-
ble opportunities, frustrations, challenges, and experiences necessitating a wide
range of differing and interacting abilities.88 We will be dependent, weak, in
need, as well as empowered and strong at different developmental stages in our
lives.89 Throughout our lives we may be subject to external and internal nega-
tive, potentially devastating, events over which we have little control—disease,
pandemics, environmental and climate deterioration, terrorism and crime,
crumbling infrastructure, failing institutions, recession, corruption, decay, and
decline. We are situated beings who live with the ever-present possibility of
changing needs and circumstances in our individual and collective lives. We
are also accumulative beings and have different qualities and quantities of
resources with which to meet these needs of circumstances, both over the
course of our lifetime and as measured at the time of crisis or opportunity.90
B. Vulnerability and Difference
One issue for a perspective- or identity-focused scholar at this point might
be the question of just where and how individual identity categories fit into a
vulnerability analysis. The theory argues, paradoxically, that while human vul-
nerability is conceived as universal and constant on an abstract theoretical level
that a construction of the legal and political subject requires, on the individual
or experiential level it is realized in particular, varied, and unique ways. This
approach allows us to see two different roles for law and policy in regard to
human vulnerability.91
Two forms of individual difference are relevant: the first form is the physi-
cal/mental/intellectual and other variations are differences in human embodi-
ment. These differences are not socially neutral, and historical reaction to some
human variations, particularly race and gender, has led to the creation of hierar-
chies, discrimination, and even violence.92 Individuals who have certain char-
acteristics have been subordinated and excluded from the benefits of society,
often because their differences are thought to indicate they are dangerous, or
interpreted as inadequacy, inferiority, or weakness.93 These differences are
often the basis for segregation of individuals into a “vulnerable population”
category, which both obscures the reality of universal vulnerability and stigma-
tizes the designated population.94 The appropriate legal response to such
instances is an improved and strengthened antidiscrimination system, perhaps
86 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 83, at 11–12.
87 Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 79, at 1753.
88 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 83, at 10–12.
89 See id. at 9–12.
90 Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 79, at 1753–54.
91 Id. at 1754.
92 Id.
93 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 83, at 4.
94 Id. at 8–10.
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complemented by affirmative action and social welfare processes to make up
for past discrimination and reduce the probabilities that discrimination will
reoccur in the future.
The second forms of relevant difference are the differences in social loca-
tion that are produced as the result of institutional practices and operations.95
While it is the case that such differences are manifested on the individual level,
attention to the functioning of institutions is the specific focus in this part of the
analysis. We are all differently situated within webs of economic and institu-
tional relationships that structure our options and create opportunities. All indi-
viduals are dependent on institutions, be it the family or market and state
institutions, because institutions provide the primary access and pathways to
gain the resources necessary to address our vulnerability.96 Interestingly, this
institutional and structural approach also allows for much more recognition of
individual differences than does an identity-based analysis, which groups indi-
viduals according to their characteristics even if nuanced and multiplied. But,
the focus is not on those distinguishing characteristics but on the institutions
which produce them.
This focus on institutions is to my mind one of the most significant aspects
of the vulnerability analysis. Societal institutions are theorized as having grown
up around vulnerability.97 They are seen as interlocking and overlapping, creat-
ing layered possibilities of opportunities and support but also containing gaps
and potential pitfalls.98 These institutions collectively form systems that play
an important role in lessening, ameliorating, and compensating for vulnerabil-
ity.99 Together and independently they provide us with resources in the form of
advantages or coping mechanisms that cushion us when we are facing misfor-
tune, disaster, and violence. Cumulatively, these assets provide individuals with
resilience in the face of our shared vulnerability.100 There are at least five dif-
ferent types of resources or assets that societal organizations and institutions
can provide: physical, human, social, ecological or environmental, and
existential.101
There is a link between these various types of resources and state responsi-
bility. Many of the institutions providing resources that give us resilience can
only be brought into legal existence through state mechanisms.102 Entities such
95 See id. at 5, 18.
96 Id. at 11.
97 Id. at 12–13.
98 Id. at 13.
99 See BRYAN S. TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25–28 (2006).
100 Urie Bronfenbrenner’s ecological child development model, for example, examines sys-
tems and assets that influence the child. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for
Children is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 817, 822 & n.18 (2009) (citing URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 6–7 (1979)).
101 Among the social resources are group affiliation and identification based on the first
form of embodied differences or distinctions. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note
79, at 1756 n.206.
102 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (granting churches and other religious organiza-
tions tax exempt status). Robert Dahl, Yale professor, observed that “without the protection
of a dense network of laws enforced by public governments, the largest American corpora-
tion could not exist for a day.” GAR ALPEROVITZ & LEW DALY, UNJUST DESERTS 138 (2008)
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as corporations, schools, workplaces, families, or churches are legitimated and
given a status that confers on them benefits and protections by law.103 Their
very content and meaning is defined through state processes. The dissolution of
many of these entities is also accomplished only through state processes. To the
extent that these legally-constituted institutions distribute significant social
goods, they should be monitored by the state. State involvement in the creation
and maintenance of these institutions requires that the state be vigilant in ensur-
ing that the distribution of such assets is accomplished with attention to public
values, including equality or justice, or objectives beyond private or profit
motivation. Instead, what we find in the United States is that, within these vari-
ous asset-conferring systems, individuals are often positioned differently from
one another. Specifically, some are privileged by the structure and operation of
these institutions, while others are relatively disadvantaged and left to cope
with their shared vulnerability on an individual level. The responsibility to
overcome existing systemic inequalities is an individual, not a state,
responsibility.
VII. CONCLUSION—A BEYOND-IDENTITIES VISION
Legal reforms are by definition institutionally focused and the trick is how
to effect a turn away, not from law, but from identities to institutional struc-
tures. When the urge for change begins with identities, all too often that is
where the energy for reform ends up being absorbed. Even an approach focused
on intersectionality (or multidimensionality) will tend to direct critical attention
to discrimination by and against individuals, not to the real or potential failures,
distortion, or corruption of societal structures that affect everyone in society. If
we focus on institutions, the significant intersections might very well be those
we see when systems, such as the educational, financial, political, familial, and
employment systems, work in unison to produce privilege and structure
disadvantage.
Gender and/or race have been the entries into progressives thinking more
complexly about equality for many decades, but the “best” contemporary femi-
nist legal theory (in my opinion) has moved beyond gender and other identity
markers and engages with institutional and structural relationships (including
ideological structures). An antidiscrimination model will not help us understand
the institutional mechanisms through which economic resources are generated
and distributed, as well as the allocation of power within society. Critical the-
ory must engage with theories of regulation and institutionalization and define
how we can access the multiplicity of power relationships we call “the state.”
We should be rethinking contract, corporation, family, and education law—not
from the perspective of identities, but from the perspective of privilege and
disadvantage and with a firm grounding in a theory of state responsibility for
the vulnerable legal subjects who actually populate society.
(quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 184 (1982)). Dahl also
noted that the view of economic institutions as private is an “ill fit” for their “social and
public” nature. Id. at 139.
103 Legal documents such as charters, documents of incorporation, licenses, or permits come
to mind.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ215.txt unknown Seq: 22 17-MAY-13 8:47
